Anglo-Turkish Society

Murat Özyüksel online presentation: ‘Sultan Abdülhamid II, “Pan”-Islamism and the Hejaz Railway’, 27 January 2026 - flyer: - slides:

1- You published the book ‘The Hejaz Railway and the Ottoman Empire: Modernity, Industrialisation and Ottoman Decline’ in 2014. What were the chief sources of information you used while researching this topic?

First and foremost, I worked in the Ottoman, German, and Austrian archives. In addition, I made use of published primary sources, contemporary newspapers and journals, and, of course, secondary literature.

2- The railway line ran from Damascus in a straight line south towards Maan and at that point was rather close (~80 km) to the gulf of Aqaba, so with a branch line as was done in Lebanon at 3 points, a Red Sea access that could have assisted in the transfer of pilgrims from Egypt or to bring supplies to build the rail-line into Arabia proper. Was this in the plans or were the British putting pressure on the Ottomans not to ‘approach their domain of Egypt’?

In 1905, an extension line was planned between Maan and Aqaba. This would not only solve the problem of transportation—which became more and more expensive in the south—but also enable rapid deployment of soldiers to the region without resort to the Suez Canal. Strong British resistance to the construction of this line was to be expected, since the Aqaba railway would improve the prospects for a possible military operation in Egypt. A significant confrontation was averted only because Abdulhamid recognized the seriousness of the British objections and retreated from his plan. The Aqaba branch line was never built. The Aqaba dispute was instructive in that it revealed the limits of British tolerance towards the construction of the Hejaz railway.

The following statement by the famous German ideologue shows that British concerns were based on a genuine foundation. Paul Rohrbach, underlining the political and military significance of the Hejaz railway, explained the importance of the Aqaba line for Germany: “One could deal a deadly blow against Britain only at one spot. This is Egypt. The conquest of Egypt by a Muslim state like Turkey will threaten Britain’s influence on sixty million Muslims in India....”

3- How cooperative were the Bedouin tribes through which the construction of the railway line passed. Were the locals ‘appeased’ through employment in the construction through their sector or payment of services such as fresh water, food etc. or did the Ottomans consider them to be naturally compliant to authority as they were the masters since the 16th century and fellow Muslims?

Very few tribes were willing to cooperate in the manner you describe. Since Bedouins could not be employed as a labour force, soldiers were used in the construction instead. The characteristic Bedouin response to the Hejaz Railway was resistance rather than cooperation. The primary reason behind the Bedouin resistance was economic. They earned significant amounts of money by renting camels to pilgrims and providing for their needs, including food. Besides, the Bedouins received from the state an annual allowance called urban surra in return for not attacking the caravans. The tribes ran the risk of losing their income if the rails reached their territory. Furthermore, Bedouins were aware of the fact that the Hejaz railway would strengthen Ottoman rule in the region. A stronger state authority in the region would mean new obligations, such as military service and tax, and eventually put an end to their waywardness. Therefore, as the Hejaz line approached Medina, Bedouin resistance grew stronger.

4- The British Empire ruled over an Empire where Muslims were a major component. Did the public opinion and press in places such as Egypt and India receive the news of this line built solely with Ottoman capital and man-power to connect the holy cities of Damascus and Mecca with enthusiasm and did it reflect the start of the national awakening movements for independence in those countries? Was the Ottoman Sultan seen as a Caliph also representing them in that capacity to lead?

Due to its significance for the Muslims, the Hejaz railway project was welcomed with a lot of enthusiasm by the Islamic world. The Ottoman press, when covering news about the Hejaz line, invited Muslims to support the Ottoman government in realizing this “auspicious” project. Indeed, The Hejaz railway was a headline story in the Indian, Iranian and Arab press as well. For example, al-Muayyad, published in Egypt, heralded the project with gratitude and stated that the caliph would be blessed everywhere because of his determination to proceed with the project. Similarly, the Islamic newspapers published in India (al-Wakil, al-Watan and the like) praised the Hejaz railway and called on Indian Muslims for help with the construction of this holy line. The Muhammedan newspaper wrote that the Hejaz railway was the single most important undertaking in the history of the Ottoman Empire and therefore all Muslims should be grateful to this great Islamic state. The Hejaz railway had created excitement in the entire Islamic world from Morocco to Egypt, from Russia to China, and Muslims were called upon to support the caliph’s project. The railway was dubbed the “holy line”, the “magnum opus of the caliph”, the “immortal work”. Abdulhamid was depicted as the “religious leader who was working tirelessly to satisfy the requirements of the Muslims”. In the eyes of Muslims, Abdulhamid and the Hejaz railway were one and the same. In fact, the official name of the railway was Hamidiye Hejaz Railway.

In short, thanks to the Hejaz railway initiative, Abdulhamid garnered unprecedented support from the Muslim community and boosted his influence and reputation as caliph. His success was a rebuke to British-backed propaganda for an Arab caliphate. A journalist summed up the status of Abdulhamid as follows: “He became at one shot the most popular man of the Islamic world, and hero of the day.”

Actually, only 20 millions of 300 million Muslims lived within the borders of the Ottoman Empire. The remaining colonized Muslim peoples inevitably turned towards the Ottoman Empire as the only independent Islamic country. Muslims living outside the Ottoman territory had far-fetched expectations of Abdulhamid’s administration—mainly because they had overrated the Ottoman Empire and the caliphate. Many Muslim countries, aspiring to regain independence, had enlisted help from the Ottoman Empire, and some had declared their allegiance to the caliph. During the rule of Abdulaziz (Abdulhamid’s predecessor) Muslim rulers of Samara, Java, and the Comoros Islands had already written letters to Istanbul expressing their eagerness to create a common front under the leadership of the caliph. In short, Muslims in colonial territories often exaggerated the power of the Ottoman state and the power of the caliphate. Expectations were unrealistically high.

5- The Emirs of Mecca and Medina due to their location of custodians of the Islamic holy sites clearly wielded local power and there was plenty of money to be made in the whole logistics of accommodation and supplies to the hordes of pilgrims, so presumably they were also wealthy. In addition, a ceremonial chest of gold and silver coins was sent annually to the holy cities (Hajj Surrah), from the Ottoman Government for funding services and supporting residents. Did they see a mortal danger in the railway taking away their lucrative trade and did the Ottomans have the power to easily replace them with more compliant emirs, or even a vali from the Turkish population or was this only done once with the final one to hold the role?

Actually, the amirs of Mecca opposed any reform that would eventually reinforce the central authority. Although they gave a pro- Ottoman impression, the amirs underhandedly provoked Bedouin tribes to continue aggression. They tried to hamper all central government investments aimed at controlling the region and facilitating information flow.

One of the most important income sources for the amirs was half of the Jeddah customs profit. In addition, Ottoman administrators sent a total of 25,000 kurush to the amirs annually, under the title atiye-i humayun. Their financial power derived from their collaboration with Bedouin tribes as well. Primarily making a living by camel transport, Bedouin tribes shared half of their profit with the amirs of Mecca. The amirs also charged three liras to each hajji arriving at the port of Jeddah in return for providing safety during their visit. “Safety” was tantamount to non-aggression by the tribes, which clearly illustrated the collaboration between the amirs and Bedouins. In conclusion, the amirs in the region were among the staunchest advocates of the status quo, so that they could maintain their good old power.

The amirs of Mecca as well as the Bedouin perceived the modernization attempts in general and the arrival of the telegraph and the railway to Medina in particular as the harbingers of change of a system that had been in place for centuries. In order to document the attitudes of the amirs toward the developments that would eventually alter the balance of power in the Hejaz, we could go further back in history and consider the practices of Amir Abd al-Muttalib. He communicated with the British consul and some sheiks in Jeddah in opposition to the Ottoman state. When Osman Nuri Pasha, who was the Hejaz military commander and governor, became aware of his actions, the Ottoman government removed Amir Abd al-Muttalib from his post and appointed Aun al Rafiq Pasha in 1882. Yet the replacement of Abd al-Muttalib by Aun al Rafiq Pasha did not alter the situation at the Hejaz. The new amir first came up with many obstacles to the extension of the Hejaz telegraph line to Mecca. As another example, he had not given his support to the proposal of the Hejaz military commander Osman Nuri Pasha in 1892 regarding the construction of the Jeddah–Mecca railway. In addition, Amir Aun al Rafiq also tried hard to have the Hejaz governors that did not accommodate him removed from office and was often successful in such attempts. For instance, Cemal, Safvet and Osman Nuri Pashas were removed from the governorship of Hejaz by Sultan Abdulhamid II in accordance with the wishes of the amir.

In conclusion, the amir, representing the local authority, and the governor, representing the central government, naturally had a tense relationship. When problems were exacerbated, the regime generally withdrew their representative and tried to prevent further escalation. Local people usually supported the amirs. In his report, Ahmet Muhtar Pasha, who had held senior posts, including that of army commander, and who proposed the abolition of the amirate, pointed out that the problem was systemic rather than personal: “as long as the system remains two-tiered, problems are inevitable, regardless of who is appointed as amir or assigned as governor.”

6- The British during this time seem obsessed with maintaining a secure connection to India via their strategic bases along the Mediterranean and beyond (Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Canal Zone, Aden, Persian Gulf). Did they see the Bagdad Railway even more of a problem for them as that was German built and approached the Persian Gulf? Was their fear based more on trade competition with the Ottomans being an alternative conduit for goods from Asia to Europe or more a fear of the Muslim populations being agitated by an assertive Ottoman state? Did the British by this stage not see the Ottomans as a useful bulwark against Russian expansion south to Iran and thus a bigger threat to the British positions in India?

Britain’s adoption of this new alternative policy was related to the outcome of the 1877–78 Ottoman–Russian War. In other words, during these years, it can be argued that the German factor mentioned in the first part of your question had not yet clearly emerged. For these developments, it is necessary to wait at least until 1888, when the Germans obtained the Anatolian Railway concession.

Actually, the Ottoman–Russian war of 1877–8 had shown that the Ottoman empire could not hope to survive without foreign support anymore. The Treaty of Saint Stephen, which contained conditions that were extremely onerous for the Ottomans, contrasted also with British and Austrian interests. Following the intervention of these two countries the Treaty of Berlin, which had slightly better conditions for the Ottoman state, was substituted for the Treaty of Saint Stephen. However, in exchange for blocking the Treaty of Saint Stephen, Britain had taken over the administration of Cyprus. This action by Britain had shown that as a result of the Ottoman empire's inability to maintain control over its lands, the British government would follow a policy of taking over those Ottoman lands that were of strategic value. Indeed, Britain’s de facto occupation of Egypt in 1882 should be understood within the framework of this new British policy.

New British foreign policy would focus on controlling strategic locations to ensure the safety of the road to India and building an “Eastern Security Road” between Britain and India. This road would run from west to east and link strategic spots such as Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Egypt, Aden, and the Persian Gulf. Britain, enjoying control over Gibraltar, Malta and Aden, would rapidly secure its domination in Cyprus and Egypt, foster ties with the “sheiks” alongside the Persian Gulf and create an area of influence. This explains why the Suez–Red Sea shores and the Arabian Peninsula gained particular importance for Britain.

7- By 1900 the Ottoman state was in a financially precarious state following the government declaring a sovereign default on its loan repayments in1875. Yet it was determined to finance this through donations of Muslims both within and beyond the Empire. How successful was this endeavour and was any section of the line ever profitable? And if so what sort of goods were transported in their brief history before WWI brought its own problems. Did pilgrim transport on this railway bring any appreciable income?

Donations to the Hejaz railway—which were 1,127,894 liras in total—were the second biggest source. This constituted 28.4 per cent of the total. If the revenue obtained through the sale of animal skins is added, the ratio reaches nearly to 34 per cent. Apparently, Muslims from all around the world financed one-third of the railway, dubbed the “sacred line”. The Austrian Ambassador Pallavicini described this as “an unprecedented fund raising method in the modern economy”. However, the figures I will now present clearly demonstrate that the role of donations from outside the Ottoman Empire in financing the Hejaz Railway should not be exaggerated. The amount of external donations was 110,000 liras and this constituted only 9.5 per cent of total donations and a mere 2.8 per cent of total funding. So, this interesting dimension of the Hejaz railway’s financing should not be overstated. For if we consider the Ziraat Bankası loans to be a form of tax, as its capital is derived from taxes, more than half of the Hejaz railway funding can be said to come from obligatory payments by Ottoman society.

The Hejaz railway did not revitalize the economic life of the region. Only the Haifa–Dera branch line brought about some positive developments in a handful of settlements in Syria and Palestine. It created remarkable dynamism in the economic and social life in Haifa. A small port town which had been inhabited by 4,000 people in 1868, Haifa became an export and import hub with a population of 23,000 in 1911. Although not comparable with the rate of development in Haifa, some settlements close to the railway in the north of Maan benefited from the railway to a certain extent. For instance, the amount of wheat sent from Hauran to Haifa doubled from 1903 to 1910. However, the Hejaz did not enjoy similar growth. The traditional economic and social structure in Hejaz province continued to prevail. As a matter of fact, apart from the pilgrimage season, there was no activity on the railway starting from the south of Amman.

Even during the pilgrimage season, the expected objective was not achieved in terms of pilgrims travelling by the Hejaz Railway. Excluding the approximately 150,000 pilgrims who reached Mecca via the Arabian desert, only 10 per cent of the remaining travellers used the Hejaz Railway. 90 per cent of the pilgrims preferred to travel by sea since the Medina – Mecca section of the Hejaz railway was never built. Those who arrived at Medina had to endure an additional 450 km of journey to reach Mecca. Obviously, the pilgrims did not wish to travel by camel under the blazing sun and threat of Bedouin attack. Unlike those who set out from Syria, they opted for a sea voyage to Jeddah, then covered the remaining 74 km to Mecca by camel. If this short line of 74 km had been built, at least those who travelled by sea would have taken the train from Jeddah to Mecca.

8- The Ottoman Sultan was determined that this sacred line be built by Muslims alone, but did they have enough trained Turkish engineers for the task, or did they rely on a set number of German engineers from the Bagdad railway and what were the biggest logistical and construction difficulties faced in this sparsely populated and mostly desert terrain? Has an estimate been made on how much the whole project cost from start to finish?

After the construction of the Hejaz railway had started, it soon became obvious that it would proceed more slowly than anticipated. The most important reason for this was the inexperience of Ottoman engineers in railway construction. The Hendese-i Müllkiye, which trained the first engineers of the empire, had been established only 16 years earlier. Consequently, the Ottoman administration was forced to retreat from the principle of recruiting only Muslim engineers, and started hiring foreigners as well. First, the German engineers working for the Anatolian and Baghdad railways were transferred to the Hejaz railway. The technical team was led by an experienced German named Meissner. Remarkable progress was observed in the construction after this restructuring.

Abdulhamid was intent on recruiting Muslim engineers for the Hejaz railway despite their inexperience. In 1904, 17 Muslim engineers were hired at his request. In order to increase this number, Ottoman engineers were sent to Germany every year to improve their technical skills. Over time, Muslim Ottoman engineers started working at all levels of the Hejaz railway project. For example, only Muslims were employed at the southern part of al-Ula, where Christians were denied entrance. The section between al-Ula and Medina was successfully completed by Muslim engineers and Muslim staff under Haji Muhtar Beg.

Construction of the Hejaz railway was plagued by a variety of problems. The shortage of water was one of the biggest issues. Particularly in the south, the problem became unbearable. Water was carried by tailor-made train cars and camels. As the construction moved southwards into the desert areas, cities and villages were few and far between, making it almost impossible to find workers. Consequently, privates of the Fifth Army deployed in Syria were recruited to work on the construction. Provision of board for more than 7,000 soldiers was an issue on its own. According to William Ochsenwald, the total cost of the railway amounted to 3,975,443 liras.

9- Do you think the Sultan Abdulhamid II fully embraced ‘pan’-Islamism himself and was this purely Ottoman or also ‘trans-national’ in aim and he saw this as an effective tool to gel the various non-Turkish Moslem nations in the Empire together and weaken any successionist tendencies? Do you think enigmatic individuals such as the diplomat / archaeologist German Baron von Oppenheim, with whom he had an audience in 1895 on Pan-Islamism may have been the person to plant that seed in him or did pan-Islamism have deeper roots in Ottoman Muslim consciousness?

After the 1877–78 Ottoman–Russian War, the secession of 5.5 million Christian subjects as a result of territorial losses in the Balkans transformed the empire into an overwhelmingly Asian and Muslim state. According to Abdulhamid, this change of population made it impossible to cling to liberal/Ottomanist policies, which rested on confidence towards the west and relied on the Christian elements of the empire. Only Islam could be a connecting force defining Ottoman identity. The new policy was thus a pragmatic one; it legitimated autocratic rule, exploited Muslim symbols and high- lighted the Muslim identity of the empire to retain the imperial lands where Muslims lived. Relations with Muslim countries grew ever closer, clerics were sent to Islamic countries to promote the office of the caliph, pro-Islam newspapers were subsidized, and closer ties were forged with religious orders all with the aim of making Yıldız Palace the Vatican of the Islamic world.

Europe interpreted Abdulhamid’s burgeoning relations with the Muslims of the world as pan-Islamism and was intimidated by his policy. Actually, Pan-Islamism, as a political threat, was largely a European construction. European diplomats, colonial administrators, and Orientalists created this image. European anxiety was not irrational. Only about 20 million of the world’s 300 million Muslims lived within Ottoman borders. The overwhelming majority lived under European colonial rule.

Germany stands apart in this story. Unlike Britain, France, and Russia, Germany had few Muslim colonies. As a result, German policymakers viewed Pan-Islamism as an opportunity, not a threat. Emperor Wilhelm had proclaimed himself the guardian of the world’s 300 million Muslims during a speech at Saladin’s tomb in Damascus. Oppenheim was a renowned orientalist and archaeologist, as well as a diplomat who was also a close adviser to Wilhelm.

According to him, India, Egypt and other British colonies were going through a process of self-awakening. The Islamic world had become a nightmare for the British. Muslims had turned to the caliph, the most respected Islamic leader. “A less cowardly sultan” harnessing the immense power of the Islamic world could bring Britain to her knees. Britain, terrorized by the power of Islam, could never venture to go to war in Europe, particularly against Germany.

As shown above, German diplomats encouraged Abdülhamid to embrace his role as leader of the Islamic world. Despite European fears and German encouragement, Abdülhamid remained cautious. He avoided adventurous policies. Abdulhamid, a ruler who was fully aware of the limits of his power and thus pursued a policy of maintaining the status quo, would obviously not try to rally all Muslims of the world to his political leadership. So, what did the caliph intend to do? By boosting his reputation and hence strengthening the office of the caliph, the sultan was trying to keep the Muslim elements of the empire together. Put differently, the purpose was to prevent the virus of nationalism from infecting non-Turkish Muslims.

10- Alī Ḥaydar Pāshā ibn Jābir[a] was the Ottoman politician who served as Emir and Grand Sharif of Mecca from 1916 to 1917 during the Arab Revolt and the First World War. He replaced the Arab Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī in that role when he rebelled. Do you think this imposition of an ‘outsider’ to that crucial role helped antagonise local Arab tribes making the tenure of the Ottomans locally even harder?

Alî Haydar Pasha’s position carried symbolic and legal significance rather than real power. Effective control over Mecca was already in the hands of Ḥusayn ibn Ali and the British-backed rebels. Consequently, Alî Haydar Pasha functioned less as an active ruler on the ground and more as a figure employed to demonstrate that Ottoman sovereignty still retained legal legitimacy. For this reason, the appointment had little practical impact on the balance of power in the region.

11- Britain had effectively annexed Egypt 1882 though it was already outside effective Ottoman control but no doubt the loss of this valuable part of the Empire by a supposed ally during the Crimean War must have been hard to swallow. Was the Hejaz Railway also a strategic endeavour, trying to develop better communications for faster troop movements in case of the British wishing to widen their control into Arabia? Or do you think by the beginning of the 20th century with limited industrialisation in the Ottoman Empire, holding that line was almost an impossible project as the ambitions of the Western Powers grew as other regions of the world were already carved up by then?

Within the framework of the answers, I have given to the questions above, it becomes evident that the Hejaz Railway had not only religious and political motivations, but also a clear military-strategic dimension. As I have noted, in response to Britain’s use of the Arab card, Abdülhamid employed Pan-Islamism as a lever, projecting a potential—rather than an actual—threat to the Great Powers. For this reason, the Sultan-Caliph could not afford to risk the loss of the holy cities.

Britain’s de facto control over Cyprus and Egypt, together with its acquisition of control over the Suez Canal, significantly weakened the Ottoman Empire’s strategic position. If Britain had decided to close the Canal, the Ottoman Empire would have been effectively cut off from the region. The construction of the Hejaz Railway, by contrast, would enable the empire to deploy troops to Syria and the Hejaz without reliance on the Suez Canal.

This, in turn, would strengthen Ottoman authority in the region, enable the empire to rein in the Bedouin tribes, and prevent them from plundering pilgrim caravans. Moreover, the autonomy of the amirs of Mecca would be curtailed, thereby paving the way for administrative and military reform in Arabia. Needless to say, in the event of a war with Britain, the ability to carry out military deployments to the region would be of vital importance.

It was for these reasons that Abdülhamid advanced the Hejaz Railway project even before the conclusion of the negotiations over the Baghdad Railway. Indeed, for Abdülhamid, the Baghdad and Hejaz railways formed parts of a single, integrated whole. This was why he declared it his heartfelt wish to see the railway extend from Istanbul all the way to Mecca. In fact, once the two lines were connected at Aleppo, the strategic significance of the combined Baghdad–Hejaz railway system becomes immediately apparent when one looks at a map.

I can answer the second part of your question by pointing to the fact that, contrary to expectations, the Ottoman Empire was able to complete the Hejaz line as far as Medina and, moreover, retain control of it until the end of the war.

12- Germany had no major colonies and number of Muslims in those few was negligible, so it could freely play the card of ‘Pan-Islamism’. Was this policy coming from the top, expressed in ways such as the German Emperor Wilhelm II who made a state visit to the Ottoman Empire 1898, or was it more pursued later by diplomats in the region to undermine British influence as part of a grand strategy? Could this early ‘political investment’ be one of the biggest factors why the Ottomans sided with Germany during WWI?

In 1888, after the enthronement of Wilhelm II in Germany, Bismarck’s cautious, pro-status quo policy was replaced by an expansionist one. The main reason behind this transformation was shortage of raw material and inadequate market opportunities, the negative impact of which could be felt more and more in the course of the rapid industrialization process. The lands best-suited to colonization had already been shared out in the last quarter of the 19th century. This had forced Germany to come up with alternative expansionist policies. In line with this “policy of peaceful expansionism” formulated once conventional ways of obtaining colonies had been exhausted, the Ottoman Empire — with its almost untouched raw material resources and the potential demand that could be created by its 25 million people—became crucial for Germany. After the integration of Austrian and Romanian economies to the German economic system through trade agreements, Wilhelm II focused his attention on the vast virgin lands of Anatolia and Mesopotamia.

In this case, Pan-Islamism appears to have been a core element of both Wilhelm II’s outlook and Germany’s Ottoman policy from the outset. Much has been written about Wilhelm’s official visit to the Ottoman Empire in 1898. However, his first visit to Abdülhamid took place earlier, in 1889, and it was during this encounter that close relations shaping the future course of bilateral ties were established between the two rulers. One important dimension of these decisions was the deliberate aim of weakening British influence.

In my view, when the process by which the Germans undertook the construction of the Baghdad Railway—conceived in their own mental world as a line stretching from Berlin to Baghdad—is considered together with their growing tendency to treat the Hejaz Railway as if it were their own project, the resulting determination to protect the Hejaz line against British and French intrigues, and the increasing influence of German commanders who had come to the Ottoman Empire to reform the army as early as the Bismarck era, it becomes clear that these factors gradually reinforced one another and, step by step, paved the way for the Ottoman Empire’s entry into the war on Germany’s side.

13- What are you working on right now?

Interestingly, this time my research on railways became intertwined with the Armenian Question. Karekin Pastırmacıyan, better known as Armen Garo, who had led the guerrilla group that seized the Ottoman Bank in 1896 in protest against the Armenian massacres, was living in exile in Geneva when the 1908 Revolution took place. Following the revolution, Pastırmacıyan was able to return to the Ottoman Empire.

After the proclamation of the Second Constitutional regime in 1908, he served as a deputy for Erzurum in parliament. During his years in the Chamber, he took the floor to engage in debates on railway policy and published a pamphlet entitled The Eastern Anatolian Railway Question (Şarkî Anadolu Şimendüfer Meselesi). I am currently conducting a study in which these parliamentary debates and the pamphlet in question are closely intertwined with the Armenian Question.

Questions by Craig Encer, January 2026