Ayla Jean Yackley online lecture: ‘Turkey’s Great Game: The pivot to hard power in Turkish foreign policy’, 30 March 2021 - flyer:
1- Under Erdogan Turkish diplomats don’t seem to do much diplomacy, do not give public declarations of policy and the whole ministry seems sidelined in a way Trump also did to a degree during his presidency. Do you think the thinking behind this was to reduce the influence of a traditionally secular institution or do you think the more muscular foreign policy Turkey now conducts means the executive presidency should always be the guiding light to reinforce this new assertiveness?
Ideology may be one factor but almost all state institutions have become weaker during Erdogan’s rule as power is concentrated in his hands. Also, he is the diplomat-in-chief, and foreign policy is determined at the presidential palace, not at the foreign ministry.
2- Do you think Turkey when pursuing a muscular foreign policy is not good at factoring and predicting unintended consequences? The Turkish invasions of Northern Syria clearly went down well with the rulling AKP party base but seems to have frightened potential foreign investors. In July 2020 Volkswagen announced it was pulling out on its proposal for a major auto plant investment worth $1.4bn, though officially it gave Covid connected worldwide fall in demand as the reason.
Many of Erdogan’s foreign policy gambits have been risky, and the consequences of some may yet be realised. For example, Turkey saw Azerbaijan’s success in the 2020 war in Nagorno-Karabakh as a decisive success, but the repercussions could include U.S. recognition of the Armenian genocide (we may find out this week). Other gambles have paid off. Most analysts believed Turkey was entering a quagmire in the Libya conflict, but its troops were able to turn the tide for remarkably little blood and treasure and finally give Turkey leverage in the east Mediterranean. Yet that too is not a settled conflict, and may yet yield problems for Erdogan.
3- In December 2019 the Trump administration rejected the Congress vote on recognising the Armenian 'genocide' of 1915. Clearly there is still a body of steam in Congress that would like to push it through, perhaps on ‘genocide day’, 24 April? In addition there is the upcoming court case in the US of a Turkish State controlled bank, Halkbank, which is being charged on six counts, including bank fraud, conspiracy and money laundering. These are serious charges and the prosecutors no longer have their hands tied by a meddling Trump. A hefty fine is almost certain. So both these looming scenarios are likely to further strain US-Turkey relations unless Biden steps in ‘ala Trump’. Do you think he is the sort of person to make an exception to his stated global policy and work against ‘rules of law’ to save a vital partnership in the region?
It is still early days for the Biden administration and the issues you raise are tests for the relationship that will determine its course. Biden is veteran politician and foreign-policy hand who can pursue pragmatism when necessary. We have seen Biden back off on a campaign promise to hold Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman to account for the murder of dissident writer Jamal Khashoggi. Turkey has in recent weeks shown itself eager to be a partner on Ukraine, in Afghanistan peace talks and with the EU, and clearly hopes the Biden administration will acknowledge its strategic importance.
4- S-400 advanced missile battery system Turkey purchased from Russia weren’t cheap (US $2.5 billion) and though they were received 2 years ago it is still not clear if they are in operational mode and the US has as a consequence ejected Turkey from the advanced stealth jet programme, F-35, so you could say Turkey is paying a double price for these. Clearly Turkish pride means it cannot now scrap this expensive purchase so it is potentially locked to sourcing new advanced weaponry from Russia and China. Do you think NATO will have to live with this scenario of a 2 rules based NATO alliance so as not to ‘lose Turkey to the other side’?
U.S. officials have made operation of the S-400s a red line and so far have rebuffed Turkish offers to find a compromise. I think the real fear is that if it can’t stop Nato partners from buying cheaper and, by many accounts better, technology from its adversaries, its weapons industry could be imperilled. So I believe more punitive measures are in store if Turkey begins using the S-400s and pursues weapons deals with China and Russia.
5- Since 2015 Erdogan’s AKP party has been in a supportive coalition with the ultra-nationalist MHP party thus consolidating the religious and nationalist votes that often overlap. However do you think there are cracks emerging as clearly these two groups which have such strong idealogical motivations find it hard to compromise on issues such as Kurdish rights? Currently the wind is definitely blowing against Kurdish / minority / women rights, which seems to show the great influence this small coalition partner weilds or is the AKP base also going into this mindset moulded by a succession of what it can mark as victories against mortal enemies?
Many see the MHP’s outsized influence shaping the government’s illiberal policies towards Kurds and women. The AKP certainly needs the MHP to achieve a legislative majority and run the civil and security services, and in turn must make concessions, especially on the Kurdish issue. Yet it feels like a version of “good cop/bad cop” in which the MHP takes the credit or fault, depending on your point of view, for policies that are aligned with core AKP values. For example, the head of the MHP last summer expressed reservations about exiting the Istanbul Convention to prevent violence against women. As for Kurds, the HDP broke with Erdogan in 2015, refusing to support the executive-style presidency, and Erdogan has punished it ever since.
Erdogan has other choices when it comes to governing partners: there are now serious three parties on the right, besides the MHP. But attracting them to a coalition would diminish the control he exerts, requiring him to return to parliamentary system, and that may be what keeps him wed to the MHP.
Questions by Craig Encer, April 2021
Suggested further reading by Ms Yackley: