Anglo-Turkish Society

Virginia H. Aksan online lecture: ‘An Empire Besieged: The Last Ottomans’, 10 February 2022 - flyer:

1- Your first book published 1995 was ‘An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi’. Coming from humble origins and rising up the ranks through his clear talent, he was a prolific writer. Amongst other postings he was an ambassador to Vienna and later the first ever Turkish ambassador to the court of Frederick the Great in Berlin in 1763/1764. After both embassies, Ahmed Resmî submitted detailed reports on the politics of the courts he encountered. Do you think he was an Ottoman pioneer in terms of the rationale for the Ottoman Empire on the need to study European politics closely and thus adapt to the changing conditions for the future survival of the Empire?

Ahmed Resmi was an usual state servant for his time because he was highly critical of the state of the Ottoman military, having personally served in the entourage of Grand Vizier Muhsinzade Pasha who was commander of the forces for the majority of the 1768-1774 War on the Danube, and part of the delegation that signed the historic Küçük Kaynarca treaty of 1774, the beginning of reciprocal diplomacy and significant concessions on the part of the Ottoman dynasty in its age of contraction. One of his other patrons, Koca Ragıb Pasha sent him to Berlin for the earliest contacts with the rising Prussian power. Writing biographies of Ottoman statesmen is not easy, especially in the eighteenth century, as so few left what we understand as memoires. What is remarkable in Ahmed Resmi’s case is the large number of manuscript copies that survive of Hulâsatü’l-İʽtibâr (A Summary of Admonitions, tr. Ethan Menchinger, 2011), suggesting a widely read treatise of the time.

2- Your book on ‘The Ottomans 1700-1923: An Empire Besieged’ (2022), deals with the later period of Ottoman Empire between 1800 and 1918 when it ends, where different powers such as Britain, Russia and France are now dominating the world order. Can we roughly categorise the 19th century as one long delaying action, despite the many reform efforts by the Ottomans, for their inevitable end as so many internal and external factors were stacked against them such as not having an industrial base?

The Ottoman nineteenth century is currently a new map being drawn by remarkable and collaborative studies on the environment, on migration and tribal settlement, on missionaries and the broad educational system, on constitutionalism and conscription, and on international law in the global colonial context, to give just a few examples. So there are many paths to chart the violence and radical change inflicted on the populations of the late Ottoman territories when asking if the end was inevitable. The chief problem after 1850 was financial. Foreign and local lenders controlled more of the sultan’s purse than he did by the 1890s. Foreign officials such as the Russian and British ambassadors “ran” Ottoman politics from the 1850s-1870. Resistance to sultanic rule was very scattered and fractured ultimately along religious and national lines, and repeated great power interventions indeed did have the reformers making contradictory concessions to survive imminent collapse. The resistance to the creation of a universal conscription system, partly based on religion, but equally because of the money derived from the tax that Christians paid for exemption (bedel), ultimately defeated any empirewide vision of constitutionalism based on universal citizenship and property rights.

3- You focused your presentation on three influential military figures: Hüsrev Pasha, (d. 1855); Ömer Pasha (d. 1871), and Mahmud Şevket Pasha (d. 1913) and their different visions of military development in their periods, and you named these periods of evolution under the titles of New Model Army and Conscription (1800-1840s), Provincial Reform and the Crimean War (1840s-1880s), German Models and Military Autonomy (1880s-1918). Clearly this evolution is part of a catch-up process to the modern armies the Ottomans were now facing and clearly they were partly successful as it could be argued they extended the life of the empire by around a century. To what extent were these visions of transformation ‘native’ so under the direction of these chief Pashas and to what extent they were moulded by foreign advisors? Was the biggest impediment to full reform lack of money and the consequent inability to dispense with irregular forces and their inherent unreliability?

Military historians will tell you that military (r)evolution(s) happens in imperial cabinets, industrialists’ factories as well as on the battlefield. The global colonial moment tossed up all kinds of experienced soldiers and renegades who wandered the globe looking for action. This was nothing new to the Ottoman Empire, whose rulers had always relied on “foreign” expertise, but the scale and highly technical aspect of the new tools changed the landscape. Mehmed Ali of Egypt’s new army was basically run by foreigners, and as a result Egypt was drawn into the global economy more rapidly than the rest of the empire as war expenses depleted the treasury. Sultan Mahmud II was parsimonious about paying his advisors, hence the prominent Ottoman statesmen as described play a more significant role but face the same trap of modernization – both new weapons and new loans supplied by the global colonizers – that befell the empire. Significantly, the need for manpower ensured the continuation of the age-old Ottoman practice of hiring irregulars to fight their wars but neglecting to control their return to society after campaigns, victorious or otherwise.

4- Through the ‘age of reform’ in the 19th century there was clearly a heavy burden of taxation, conscription and land reform of the various Ottoman populations and Ömer Pasha and the like would be called to suppress local uprisings. So did the Ottomans have a dual challenge when dealing with border regions such as Bosnia and Kurdistan of having to use strong arm tactics to compel the populations to submit while trying to dissuade them from separatist tendencies?

The 1840s-1880s are illustrative of precisely that fact. It is a period of “counterinsurgency armies” when the Ottoman military ran “small wars”’ in various territories such as Bosnia / Kurdistan / Albanian with the dual aim of strengthening the reach of the “state” through municipal and property reforms, often requiring new taxes, while imposing conscription empire-wide.

5- Land across a large swath of the Ottoman Empire seems to have been held by large Muslim estates running a sort of tax farm system where the peasants were at the bottom of the pile. Was land reform during this time geared towards breaking up these local monopolies for practical financial reasons or more for relief and land distribution to local populations to reduce their risk of rebelling?

Modern citizenship requires censuses, conscription voting privileges and property rights. Ahmed Midhat Pasha, the greatest of the mid-century reformers, had notable successes as governor in Bulgaria and initially in Iraq, in the effort to document land ownership, regulate taxation, redraw provincial boundaries and promote educational opportunities for the Muslim populations in particular. His was a vision that could not be sustained in the face of the resistance of the great provincial landowners, in spite of repeated efforts at reform, a problem that persisted well into the early Republic.

6- Constitutional reform advanced in fits and starts in the second half of the 19th century and 1877-78 with the excuse of the defeat against Russia the parliament was closed by the new Sultan Abdülhamid II. Presumably this act suppressed debate on military and other reforms as well so were counter-productive in the long-term. Abdulhamit II became the overseer of all military matters leading to the erosion of the fighting ability of the army and navy. Was it in this highly suppressed environment that Prussian military advisers were on the ascendancy as opposed to British and French and that led to a focus on an arms race mentality?

The Prussian/German connection to military reform had a long history in Istanbul. Mahmud II’s singular achievement in reforming the artillery corps was enabled by a Prussian advisory group that included Helmuth von Moltke. The arms race was multi-national after the Crimean War, including the United States as well as France and Britain, though Britain’s emphasis was on the reform of the navy. Abdülhamid II was notoriously paranoid and did initially prevent renewal of the military. Otto von Bismarck was quite ready to sell the Ottomans military equipment in the global competitive market, but the actual late-Ottoman German mission was negotiated between Sultan Abülhamid II and Tsar Wilhelm II, with Mahmud Şevket and von der Goltz as the intermediaries.

7- Under Mahmut Sevket Pasha the military became heavily German supplied but its biggest weakness was an educated officer corps and efforts were made in that direction. Was it through this trained officer class that reforms could finally be enforced by military men leading to return to a parliamentary system and bringing with it the Second Constitutional era of 1908?

The slow development of a modernized officer class resulted from a number of factors: French enlightenment thought dominated in the first half of the nineteenth century but did not result in a significant alternation to the military curriculum or an independent officer class of significant size. The Ottoman administrative class was multi-dimensional – they served as governors, commanders, bureaucrats and were insufficient in number. Recruitment was still deeply embedded in the patrimonial style of the sultan, and resistance from the ulema was also significant. A further factor was that graduates of the academy, truly only significant in number circa 1850, were repeatedly thrown into untenable military contexts that killed off many of them before they moved beyond novice status. The operational side of military reform – mapping, strategy, mock battles, did not truly take hold until the 1880s. This followed on a significant investment in military training institutions in all the provinces, and a gradual rise in literacy. The CUP group and significant Arab leaders of the period were a product of those trends and many promoted constitutionalism in an era of extraordinary censorship under Abdülhamid II. I believe it can be said that the military republic of Turkey and many Middle Eastern countries resulted from the need for a well-educated military, itself a matter of survival and self-defense.

8- Was the aborted countercoup a ‘wake-up call’ to Mahmut Şevket Pasha and other progressive officials and thus they acted fast to ‘stop the rot’ and deposed the Sultan and installed a replaced and thus the military became autonomous and no longer under palace control and yet Mahmut Sevket Pasha resisted the attraction of being the head of a military dictatorship presumably seeing dangers in that set-up as well? In 1913 the CUP regained power in a coup and repressed other opposition parties, effectively establishing a one-party oligarchy led by the “Three Pashas”, Talaat Pasha, Enver Pasha, and Cemal Pasha. They turned to Mahmut Şevket Pasha because of his popularity and he accepted the positions of Grand Vizier and War Minister, which didn’t last long. Do you think Mahmut Şevket Pasha accepted these positions with a heavy heart as he could see the Committee of Union and Progress were not of his ideological vision but that he also possibly saw the need for a ‘steady hand’ as the Empire was going through multiple convulsions at the time? Do you think the assassination of Mahmut Şevket Pasha in 1913 was a disaster for the Ottoman Empire as through that loss there was no longer a counter-weight independent personality and he was succeeded by a puppet of the CUP’s radical faction, and the Young Turk Triumvirate leading the country to a path where minorities were heavily persecuted?

Much work on the CUP has identified perhaps 20-22 members of the secret committee that coordinated opposition and after 1913 ran the government of the Ottoman Empire on the verge of war. Mahmud Şevket Pasha was cognizant of, but not engaged with the radical views of the CUP. His commitment and contributions to the modernization of the Ottoman military are well-attested and he seems to have been a much beloved commander. One of the constant features of the Ottoman revolutionary coalitions is fragility. What I think we do not appreciate is the compression of time and the enormity of the task that faced the army in the last couple of decades of the nineteenth century. If one adds to that the censorship – acknowledged to be the worst among the empires of the period – and the ideological divide between Islam/secularism in the CUP Central Committee itself, it must have been a most hazardous road through the factions of the time. Mahmud Şevket has left almost no personal reflections. That he moved swiftly and effectively to prevent a further decline of security in Istanbul in 1909 can be read as a military response to a dangerous situation. That it was clearly a moment to make the final break to constitutionalism may also have been obvious. But constitutionalism exposed the deep ethno-religious divides even as it attempted to represent late Ottoman populations in their immense diversity. While it is convenient to see the assassination of Mahmud Şevket Pasha as the death-knell of the empire, it is also worth remembering that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was part of his general staff.

9- What are you working on right now?

I have no major projects underway but remain interested in the broad historiographical sweep of Eurasia in its current iteration and the bashibozouks as emblematic of the cultural fascination with the “Turk” and the tribal formations resisting colonialism in the post-1750 world.

Questions by Craig Encer, March 2022

References:

Aksan, Virginia. “The Ottoman Military and State Transformation in a Globalizing World,”Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East 27 (2007), 257-70.

Anscombe, Frederick F. “The Ottoman Legacy to post-Ottoman States,” in Rhoads Murphey, ed. Imperial Lineages and Legacies in the Eastern Mediterranean: Recording the Imprint of Roman Byzantine, and Ottoman Rule. London: Abingdon, OX: Routledge, 2017, 143-55.

Bâli, Aslı Ü. “Artificial States and the Remapping of the Middle East, ”Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 52:2 (2020), 405-60.

Gingeras, Ryan. Fall of the Sultanate: The Great War and the End of the Ottoman Empire 1908-1922 (Oxford, OUP, 2016). He has a Penguin book on the early Republican period on the way.

Grant, Jonathan A. Rulers, Guns and Money: The Global Arms Trade in the Age of Imperialism (Harvard, 2007)

Provence, Michael. The Last Ottoman Generation and the Making of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge: CUP, 2017)

Uyar, Mesut. The Ottoman Army and the First World War. London: Routledge, 2021.

Wasti, Syed Tanvir. “Three Ottoman Pashas at the Congress of Berlin 1878”, Middle Eastern Studies 52:6 (2016): 938-52.

Worringer, Renée. A Short History of the Ottoman Empire. Toronto: UT Press,2021.

Zürcher, Erik J. “The Macedonians in Anatolia: The Importance of the Macedonian Roots of the Unionists for their Policies in Anatolia”, Middle Eastern Studies 50:6 (2014), 960-75.