John Curry online lecture: ‘The Legacy of Mezemorta Hüseyin Paşa: Corsair, Captain, Ottoman Grand Admiral’, 2 December 2021 - flyer:
1- How much do we know of the social structure and degree of tolerance to minorities in Algiers and region during the 17th century? Was piracy not particularly local to this coastline, but endemic across the Mediterranean, but the rise of successful privateers like Mezemorta Pasa led it to be dubbed the “Barbary Coast?”
The term Barbary Coast derives from the Berber peoples who inhabited the region alongside the Arabs for most of the region’s history, and goes back far further than this period. However, the upsurge of corsairing that commences after the end of the Reconquista in Spain and the growing conflict with the Habsburgs in the sixteenth century certainly increased the attention paid to the region. By the seventeenth century, a general breakdown of order across much of the globe as a result of the General Seventeenth-Century Crisis of climate change led to acts of corsairing and piracy to become endemic throughout not only the Mediterranean, but also the Atlantic and other regions of the world as well. As for the question of minorities, not much has been done on this period, and most literature instead focuses on the question of why Christianity declined in North Africa in the wake of the early Islamic conquests. But we do know that Jewish communities were active in the coastal cities, and noted in mercantile contexts. And some indigenous Christian Arab communities persisted into the period, and seem to have been granted tolerance under the traditional Islamic legal system that applied throughout most of the Muslim world.
2- Do we have any handle on the numbers of captives held and used on the oars by both sides during this time? Was there a system by which when a slave who had served his time would gain his freedom when his age would mean he would be of little use to their captors?
From the studies I’ve seen, galleys could be staffed by anywhere from 300 to 450 oarsmen, depending on their size and construction. By the end of the seventeenth century, we know that the French navy employed around 15,000 men, the majority of whom were probably oarsmen of various kinds, and it can be assumed that the Muslim corsairs were not significantly different, though their navies were more autonomous and likely smaller than what Louis XIV could bring to bear. In the case of France, we know that galley slaves were used for a minimum ten-year term. The grim reality was that few survived, and most who were eventually broken by the hard labor were thrown overboard if they did not seem capable of quick recovery. Assessing this in the North African context is more difficult, as ransoming played a role in who might serve extensively in a galley or not, and we do not know the extent to which corsairs had a similar method. But since many of them were European renegados, one might assume that they employed similar practices.
3- Presumably piracy by nature was opportunistic and whichever prize which was lightly defendedand carrying the wrong flag was fair game. Were there however some rules, such as pilgrims of the same faith or women and children who were not enslaved?
On the Muslim side, it was generally forbidden to enslave free Muslims unless they were rebelling against the state, so I suspect this was probably rare. The Christian side was more complicated, as the divisions between European states meant that during times of war, they viewed each other’s subjects as fair game, as the Picotti Incident that I mentioned points out. But no, women and children were not exempt from the ransom and enslavement game, and there is a whole literature preserved from the period about European women who were enslaved, and discussed their experiences in that role. It seemed to have a special horrific fascination for contemporary audiences during the period, and were often tied to didactic religious themes about maintaining one’s faith at all costs.
4- Did the North African coastal states keep archives and has anything remained to help in this study from that region?
This is a question that I have not yet been able to pursue, and would desperately like to know more about. My impression is that the troubled political situation in Algeria in recent years have impeded the ability to do research, but resources do exist, including manuscripts that may be period-specific, and could very well flesh out our knowledge considerably. In the past decade, attempts to preserve this heritage in digital format appear to have begun, as this web page notes: A recent book by Leila Temime Blili on the Regency of Tunis during this period seems to rely heavily on published manuscripts and European sources, though the bibliography suggests there are existing manuscript sources that are the foundations for that published work in her bibliography. I suspect the same might be said for Algiers?
5- Do we know how Mezemorta and other corsairs held their money? Do you think like in the movies it would be a chest full of gold coins in his cabin on the ship from which he would pay his sailors / soldiers?
We have an example of this from the end of the Morean War, when there was a mutiny in the Ottoman naval ranks in 1698. The sources explain that Mezemorta solved the problem by taking out loans from the Ottoman leaders on the ground who were managing naval matters at Gelibolu, and then paying the sailors from that money and repaying it later. An earlier mutiny in the wake of the Chios victory saw him also having to pay the sailors before they would re-board the ships, but the chronicle only says that he came to the island with the fleet’s treasurer to pay, which suggests that there might have been some funds on board. But the major Ottoman ports of Cesme and Izmir were not far away either, so we can’t discount that funds could have been brought from those places in much the same way. However, as it was dangerous to carry around large sums on board, it’s not likely that huge amounts would be found on any one ship. After all, storms and weather were often just as dangerous as enemy fleets during this era, as the chronicles repeatedly point out, and you wouldn’t want your whole treasury to go down with the ship! Most places had an infrastructure in place to facilitate transactions on land, as the 1698 incident points out.
6- Do we know much about the identity of the Renegados, as the European pirates who settle in North African states, their names, origins and their eventual outcome?
Alan Jamieson’s book Lords of the Sea has an extensive description of some of the major renegados captains, such as Simon Danser, Ivan de Veerboor, and Jan Janszoon, all of whom were famous Dutch Muslim converts who were extremely effective corsairs. The most famous Englishman who became a corsair was John Ward, but there were others as well, some of whom switched sides back and forth whenever it was convenient, sometimes selling their services and knowledge of the other side’s infrastructure and logistics as part of the process. Some of them did come to bad ends, dying in violent engagements, but many others also retired as wealthy men in various places, and died in their beds.
7- Huseyin Mezzemorta Pasha as with other corsairs would have a Janissary representative on board whose instructions he was supposed to follow. Were these Janissaries effectively how the Ottoman Sultans were able to have some degree of control on these Algerian corsairs?
This is a good question, but the answer is probably that I doubt it was about the Ottoman government in Istanbul, at least in terms of direct control. The janissary in question was probably more a representative of the ruling clique in charge of Algiers at the time, whose job was to prevent violations of the growing number of peace arrangements that the deys were negotiating with various parties. I suspect they also might have encouraged targeting of ships that were enemies of the Algierian regency, even if they were not the most lucrative targets. The corsairs sometimes resented this restriction on their autonomy, and did not have the same concerns about where their livelihood was coming from, and the janissary was ostensibly there to keep them in check—or at least this is my guess.
8- Huseyin Mezzemorta Pasha was clearly a “wise fox” who fooled the besieging French fleet captain Duquesne that he could secure the funds for the lifting of the siege as opposed to the second Dey of Algiers Hasan Baba, and thus was able to return to the city, now free, and depose Hasan Baba with the help of accomplices. Does this in your opinion show Mezemorta had a good understanding of how his enemies thought and was able to exploit that knowledge skillfully for his advantage and do you think this set a pattern for the future as well?
There is no doubt in my mind that Mezemorta understood the politics and tactics of his age extraordinarily well, and while that did not preclude him making mistakes, such as losing control of Algiers in 1689 and overspending on attacks against the regency of Tunis, he clearly won more of these battles than he lost. By the time he became Dey of Algiers, he had already been active in Mediterranean politics and diplomatic relations for years, as his relations with Marseilles showed, so I don’t think this set any precedent as much as it just built off his life experiences to that date. He was likely Tunisian, after all, and quite familiar with how various regencies worked.
9- From 1684 onwards the Morean War was fought between Venice and the Ottomans around Southern Greece and by 1685 the war was going to the advantage of the Venetians who were able to secure a number of ports. Despite the Ottoman Sultan’s pleas Mezemorta was not interested in getting involved as he was engaged in his own local wars. Yet in a swift action he gets deposed andarrives as a refugee in Istanbul, but the Ottomans now have a problem on their hands of dealing with a persona-non-grata for the Algerians whose naval support they also need. So he is not given the role of the chief admiral but minor roles in the Danube / Black Sea in 1690. Do you think this also worked in Mezemorta’s favour where he could direct energies to build up the fleet and its training before he was allowed to face-off the Venetians later, and so increasing the chances of success and glory?
The assignment to the Black Sea region clearly served everyone’s interests at the time, and while Mezemorta may not have seen it that way in 1690, I think there’s a case to be made for this interpretation. The Sultan needed to humor the Algerians to try and maintain their support, but he didn’t want to sideline such a valuable asset, so he moved him into a theater of the war that desperately needed logistical support but was not so visible to the Mediterranean cadres. We don’t really know how effective Mezemorta was in that—the Ottomans did regain several key strongholds from the Austrian armies that year, but it’s also possible that these advances were already being brought to fruition by the time Mezemorta got involved. Whatever the case, it quickly became clear he might be better used in the Mediterranean, where the situation was more dire. More digging would be necessary to determine what motivations were clearly in play during this time, and the matter is complicated by the fact that there was a transition between Sultans Suleyman II and Ahmed II in 1691that also shook things up. What is clear is that Mezemorta’s impact was pretty quick in coming, and definitely shored up the defense of Crete by 1692.
10- By 1698 the Ottoman finances were clearly in a parlous state despite the victories against the Venetians but having lost major land campaigns in Europe. Do you think it was this lack of funds that rescued the Venetians from total defeat and they were able to hold on to a toe-hold in the Peloponnese region? Do you think this was a pattern of the ongoing Ottoman decline of not being able to fully capitalise on victories as the state was ruled by now antiquated decision making bodies and fiscal rules?
It was both the fiscal problems, but also a product of the fact that the Ottomans had no way to achieve victory in the conflict after the complete defeat at the Battle of Zenta in 1697. It was really the collapse of the Balkan front that guaranteed an end to the conflict, and once the Venetians’ allies moved toward a settlement at Karlowitz, the Venetians were drawn into that process as well. We should also keep in mind that the Venetians were experiencing financial and political problems of their own by the end of the century, and they were probably happy to end a conflict that had been going on for a decade and a half by then to try and stabilize their own finances.
11- Is the main gist of the Kanunname he prepared shortly before Mezemorta’s death the minimum levels of shipping and training required to secure the Ottoman naval frontier or was there also technical and strategy knowledge in those pages?
My understanding of the document, insofar as I can tell, is that it was basically a list of the types of ships, numbers of sailors, and resources necessary in terms of food and war material to maintain a ready fleet to defend Ottoman interests at sea, as a result of his experiences during the Morean War. In short, it was primarily about logistics, and doesn’t have a lot of text that discusses tactics or strategy, as those could shift based on circumstances, and no one knew what those would have been in the future given that the Morean War had ended.
12- What are you working on currently?
Unfortunately, the ongoing pandemic has forced me to devote much of the past year and half to online teaching and other such projects; serving on the development committee for the Advanced Placement test for World History for U.S. high school students has also been a bit of a distraction too. So I’m embarrassed to say I haven’t been working on this type of research nearly as much as I would have liked. But in the future, I would like to try and develop this account further, as it is really a half-finished project at present, especially in the latter years of Mezemorta’s career. There are also still gaps to fill in regard to other actors in the story, especially in the case of the Venetians, about which I am ill-informed at present. I was also working on a project detailing the foundation of the Nasuhi Sufi order that Mezemorta played an instrumental role in founding, along with the materials found in their library. Building that research into a full-length study is partially completed as well, and needs to be brought to fruition.