Online lecture: ‘A Failed Success: American Naval Engineers in Istanbul, 1831-1842’, Ayşegül Avcı, 6 July 2022 - flyer:
1- The reforming Sultan Mahmut II reigned from 1808 to 1839 and clearly was open and welcoming to Western experts and know-how to modernise his arms forces including the navy. Did Mahmut fully realise that without a modern navy the Ottomans couldn’t hope to hold on to their far flung possessions and so was this a priority for him?
Following Selim III, Mahmud II was fully aware of the troubling condition concerning the naval forces of the Empire, and thus attached great importance to its modernization, yet whether he prioritized it considering the Ottoman possessions in distant quarters is not an easy question to answer. In 1830s, the attention of the Ottoman administration was on Egypt, and I believe both the Sultan himself, and the high officers of the administration knew the Empire depended on foreign support (mainly British). In this case, not only the naval but also land forces required modernization, and the Empire did not have the luxury to prioritize one over the other. Mahmud II knew he had to improve the armed forces all together, from technical advancement to military/naval personnel, but being stuck among the local/traditionalist criticism, foreign pressure and financial burden, he was unable to take the necessary steps to accomplish his ideals for the future of the Empire.
2- The naval battle of Navarino in 1827 was a crushing defeat for the Ottoman / Egyptian navy facing against an alliance of Britain, France and Russia. Was this coalition states were therefore seen by Ottomans as enemies for a time, thus opening the position of the US being a neutral party which was therefore palatable in terms of technology transfer and purchase of war ships?
Following the battle of Navarino, Ottomans immediately turned to the US to initiate negotiations for the purpose of signing the First Treaty of Amity and Commerce, with the aim of obtaining war ships from the US. The distrust towards the Great Powers diverted Ottoman attention towards the US, however, despite the distrust, the relations were mended quickly, especially with Great Britain. It is true that the battle of Navarino enabled the Ottomans to fill the void with the US in terms of naval modernization efforts, yet if it were not for Henry Eckford, Ottomans might have rejected to ratify the treaty without the secret article, and thus block US naval enterprise from entering the Empire.
3- The Ottoman - American relations formally started with the commercial treaty of 1830. Did American ships visit Ottoman ports before this date and if so did they have to use a ‘flag of convenience’ to be granted trading status?
American vessels had been visiting the Ottoman ports since the Colonial times, and according to Francis Werry, the British Consul in Smyrna, US flag was first seen in the city in 1797. Until the end of the War of 1812, many American ships continued to use the British flag for protection in return for a fee. With David Offley’s (an American merchant based in Smyrna) personal and informal arrangement with Ottomans concerning the use of American flag instead of British, fewer Americans preferred paying extra fees to the British Consulate and finally with the 1830 Treaty this practice was terminated completely.
4- The Second Barbary War (1815), fought between the United States and the Ottoman Empire’s North African regencies of Tripoli, Tunis and Algeria, known collectively as the Barbary states brought an end to the American practice of paying tribute to the pirate states and helped mark the beginning of the end of piracy in that region, which had been rampant in the days of Ottoman domination (16th–18th centuries). So clearly the Americans more than the Europeans were prepared and defeated this long-term menace for trade in the Mediterranean. What were the commodities the US were particularly interested in during the first half of the 19th century?
Although the American Government agreed to pay tribute to the North African States, the constant problems and demands forced the US to follow a more aggressive approach towards the North African regencies, which ended with US victory. American merchants were free to conduct trade with the Mediterranean countries as well as the Ottoman Empire without the threat of piracy from then on. Especially after 1815, with the end of the War of 1812, the US commerce flourished in the region. Besides opium, the American vessels purchased mainly figs, raisins and other fruits, nuts, copper, lead, box wood, goat’s wool, gums, hare skins and sponges; however, the markets in New England could not absorb all of the products, thus a major part of these articles were sold in European ports. Yet the main import of Smyrna was opium, which had a market in the US and the East Indies, but mainly in China. In return Americans exported cochineal, coffee from the West Indies, cotton yarn, dye woods, indigo and muslins from East Indies, rum, spices, sugars and tin. Considering the various cargoes and departure/destination points, it is clear that American vessels were actively conducting carrying trade in this period.
5- Were the American shipyards during this period more efficient than its European counterparts to off-set the additional cost of long-voyage export to Ottoman and other domains?
American merchant fleet was among the most powerful and largest in number in the early nineteenth century, and except the times of war, US shipyards constructed merchant vessels for the US market. However, the cost of voyage to Ottoman ports was eliminated through the carrying trade. That is, American merchants touched at numerous ports, buying and selling the products in demand at a particular port. In this respect, American commercial relations with the Ottoman Empire, and with any other country for that matter, should be considered as part of a wider net including different commodities, countries, treaties, geographies, etc.
6- Do we know much about the American community in Turkey during the 1830s and did they benefit co-incidentally from the venture to modernize the Ottoman navy?
Americans were living mainly in Constantinople and Smyrna in the 1830s, and they were composed of diplomatic representatives, merchants, missionaries and travellers. The information about the daily and social life of Americans and their interactions with the local and foreign populations in Ottoman lands is given mainly in travel narratives, yet still very limited. However, it is clear that the naval engineers helped American community to flourish and gain strength in this period. They enabled the diplomatic representatives obtain presence with Sultan Mahmud II, which would otherwise be prevented due to the minor rank of David Porter, Charge D’Affaires in Constantinople. Moreover, their prestige among the Ottoman officials allowed American naval officers who visited Constantinople to be welcomed with high regards. These engineers also supported the missionaries financially with personal donations, but more importantly they provided the missionaries with the much-needed network and respect for opening schools to serve the Muslim population. Finally, they offered assistance and hospitality to American travellers, some of who had the chance to experience special favors from the Ottoman administration. In this respect, I conclude that the American community was the main beneficiary of this naval enterprise, because they were able to lay out a strong foundation by obtaining the support and respect from Ottoman authorities with the help of Eckford and Rhodes.
7- Sultan Mahmud II hired Henry Eckford, who had arrived on speculation, sold the war-ship in which he arrived and the began to build ships in the Turkish shipyard for the Ottoman Navy, starting with a small schooner, a frigate, and a 64-gun ship constructed using a frame imported from New York City. He also began to design the 100-gun ship-of-the-line Mahmoudieh. Mahmud II was impressed enough to consider giving Eckford a high imperial rank. But within just over a year after his arrival he died, probably of cholera. Eckferd’s 8 point petition to the Sultan is preserved in the Ottoman archives and emphasized teaching Ottoman students in the US English and vocational training amongst other things. Do you think even if Eckford lived longer he wouldn’t be successful as his vision of thorough education for the mariners was way beyond the capacity of Ottoman navy hierarchy?
First of all, let me correct the information on Mahmudiye, which was designed by Ottoman naval engineers and architects and launched in 1828. Eckford did not design but repaired the vessel.
About Eckford’s vision on educating the Ottoman youth, I would cautiously suggest a failure, even if he had lived longer. The reason is the continuity of American presence at the Imperial Arsenal. Following the death of Eckford, Foster Rhodes was appointed as the Constructor in Chief, which suggests the satisfaction of Ottoman officers with Rhodes’ abilities and skill. Although Eckford’s fame exceeds Rhodes’ in the world, the latter was the most influential in Ottoman lands since he served the Empire for around seven years, building numerous vessels of various types and measurements including the first steamers. Rhodes received the same respect and prestige that Eckford enjoyed as well as the attention from the Sultan himself. Moreover, the fact that Rhodes was Eckford’s apprentice and foreman, it can be argued that both men shared similar views and intentions about the importance of education. Rhodes’ pride over the success of Ottoman carpenters and apprentices who were educated at the Imperial Arsenal, as well as his efforts to bring American naval officers to educate Ottoman naval officers prove that both Rhodes and Eckford put emphasis upon education as the source of naval modernization. However, their efforts were not independent from international dynamics, monetary problems and reaction towards modernization that curbed the authority of Sultan Mahmud II, and thus the modernization efforts. In other words, the main reason behind the failure in training Ottoman youth was not necessarily related to American efforts, but more so to the Ottoman administration.
8- Foster Rhodes who followed in Eckford’s role was also clearly very capable and built a range of ships for the Ottomans and convinced them to convert to steam-ship construction to keep up with technology. Was there again the same problem that despite funds being provided by the Sultan to build up the navy were available, Ottoman education and resources couldn’t keep up with the advancing technology that became more complex with steam ships. Did this leave Great Britain in a strong position as it had the best steam engines for export at the time?
Naming the first steamer built in Ottoman lands Eser-i Hayr [worthy monument] suggests a wishful idealism. The idea that Ottomans would be able to construct steam vessels was part of modernization efforts, yet more than the technological complexities, I would suggest poor management at the Arsenal and in the wider Empire and the lack of funds as the main causes of the failure. Great Britain was the main provider of steam engines for the world navies, and there were only few nations that could produce a steamer independent of foreign support. Despite the efforts of Eckford and Rhodes to improve the Arsenal, which would, in the future, allow Ottomans to design and create their own steam engines, proved inefficient in the face of inadequate funds, and Egyptian resurrection in the 1830s. The immediate need of obtaining steamers pushed Ottomans to purchase instead of building them, and British support against Mehmet Ali’s forces increased British domination over the Ottoman administration as well as naval modernization, which, combined with the death of Mahmud II, the main supporter of American engineers, led to the replacement of Americans with the British at the Arsenal.
9- With the Greek revolution of 1820s the Greek speaking mariners and ship-yard workers were dismissed and presumably the replacements were mostly inexperienced and poorly educated. Do you think this led to future disasters such as the battle of Sinope of 1853?
Naval historians generally agree on the idea that Russian forces were able to defeat Ottoman forces at Sinop due to the damaging effect of explosive shells on wooden hulls. The inability of Ottomans to follow and take precautions against the technological advancements in foreign navies should be considered a result of inadequacy and inefficacy of naval administration. The fact that only one ship escaped from the attack may also indicate inexperienced mariners and commanders. In this respect, it can be argued that incompetency was still an issue in front of naval modernization after around a decade following the termination of American venture at the Arsenal.
10- What are you working on currently?
I developed an interest in the Second World War and wrote my MA thesis on Turkish-American relations at that period. Since then, I have an intention of focusing on Lend-Lease program in Turkey. I collected materials from the American archives during my recent visit, and intend to extend my research to Turkish and British archives in order to study the influence of Lend-Lease on social and diplomatic interactions both during and immediately afterwards of the Second World War. Besides providing the war materials, Lend-Lease was essential in maintaining the neutrality of Turkey in favour of the Allied nations, and creating a positive image for the Americans. Some of the questions I would like to ask are: What was the main content of Lend-Lease program in Turkey and how did it differ from the programs in other countries? How did Lend-Lease change, if it did, the decision-making process in the Republic of Turkey concerning the attitude towards belligerent nations? How did American and British administration use Lend-Lease as a propaganda tool against the Axis powers? What was the influence of the program in shaping Turkey’s post-war politics? I believe, the answers to these questions will enlighten an essential episode in Turkish-American relations, which might be considered as both a continuation of technological diffusion and preceding a much larger operation and cooperation between the two countries during the Cold War.