Elçin Macar online lecture: ‘The Kurtuluş Ship’s Story: The Turkish Humanitarian Aid to Greece in the World War 2’, 17 January 2023 - flyer:
1- To what extent did the Istanbul and New York based Greek communities were influential for raising public perception of the dire state of the starving Greek civilians post-German occupation of Greece and did the relief effort go beyond food stuff, such as medicines and first-aid kits?
Admittedly, the Greek minority in Istanbul was much less powerful than the Greeks in the United States. Nevertheless, it was able to organize relief campaigns under the auspices of the Greek Ambassador Rafail and his wife. In the US, the Greek War Relief Association was very effective. Orthodox Archbishop (later Patriarch) Athenagoras and Skouras, owner of the 20th Century Fox film company, were very successful in mobilizing public opinion. They raised money for food from Turkey and mobilized public opinion to pressure the British government to grant permission. They also often helped to cover the situation in Greece, especially in the New York Times.
2- When negotiating for the logistics of Kurtuluş and other cargo ships to navigate across the Aegean did the Turkish authorities deal directly with the Germans or via the puppet Greek government installed by the Nazis? For the Germans was the issue less saving Greek lives more saving face and showing to the world that their occupation was begin?
I have never seen any documentary evidence of Turkey establishing relations with the puppet government in Greece. Both the memoirs of Erkin, then Secretary of the Foreign Ministry (foreign minister in the 60s) and the Turkish state archives show that the relationship was established directly with Germany. In fact, for the German administration, a controllable famine was not a bad thing at all in order to contain the resistance. They thought that the resistance of the Greeks, who would have to think about their stomachs first, would be weak. But things had gotten so bad that it was now also important to save the lives of the Greeks, because it was damaging their own prestige and providing material for counter-propaganda.
3- Was the president of Turkey at the time, İsmet İnönü, a political realist and recognised Turkish diplomatic and military limits and didn’'t push for the incorporation of the Dodecanese islands in 1946, when the Venizelos–Tittoni agreement between Greece and Italy, was resolved with those island to Greece’s favour?
In this regard, İnönü had the experience of the Lausanne Conference. There, the Turkish delegation asking for the Aegean islands was told that the islands had been captured by Greece during the Balkan Wars, not during the occupation of Anatolia. It was the same for the Dodecanese islands, Italy had captured them in 1912. Moreover, the population of these islands was predominantly Greek, except for a small Turkish minority. Above all, Turkey did not enter the war on the side of the Allies, nor was it occupied like Greece. So such a demand would have been unrealistic.
4- The head of the Greek Red Cross had to convince the Allies of the dire state of Greece during the winter 1941-42 and at great risk to themselves with assistants take photographs of the suffering and starvation producing 3 albums for 3 key recipients and only one is delivered / received in time, to Feridun Demokan, the Red Cross representative on the Kurtuluş ship who in turn sends it along to the Greek Government in exile in London. How quickly did the Allies realise the magnitude of the crisis and take over from Turkey to do the chief food distribution in Greece?
As official documents show, the US and British leaders were already well informed about the situation in Greece by the exiled Greek government diplomats. The turning point was the publication of these photographs in Life magazine, which made the public realize the gravity of the situation and spurred their governments to take action.
5- Greece and Turkey along with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia signed the 1938 Salonika Agreement which abandoned the demilitarised zones along the Turkish border with Greece that were a result of the Treaty of Lausanne. In addition the agreement removed the arms restrictions placed on Bulgaria after World War I by the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine and allowed it to occupy the demilitarised zone bordering Greece. This on the face of it seems counter to reducing regional tensions and simmering border disputes? What was the rational for the various regional powers to sign this agreement?
First of all, with the Montreaux Convention signed in 1936, such arrangements in Lausanne had already lost their meaning. Secondly, the Balkan countries had been afraid of Bulgaria’s aggression policy for a long time and it was necessary to satisfy it.
6- The Turkish Government had to cut down bread rations to its own citizens during WW2 and it was common knowledge that foodstuff was being exported to Greece as part of that relief. Was there open hostility from Turkish opposition parties at the time and do you think this resentment might have been a factor in intensifying the anti-minority measures such as the Wealth Tax that was enacted in 1942?
I cannot establish such a relationship. Turkey should have helped Greece in accordance with both the Tripartite Agreement and the Balkan Pact, but it did not, and it was even welcomed with understanding. In this sense, it was paying its debt. I believe that the anti-minority policies have two sources. The first one was aimed at satisfying Germany, which especially wanted the Jews to be suppressed. The second was in line with the new Turkey’s policy of creating a national bourgeoisie.
7- From 1878, the newly independent Romania had initiated a paternalistic policy in support of the Vlachs of Macedonia including their desire to gain recognition of their right to have their own schools, churches, clerics, and so on. Their efforts paid off by 1905 when the Ottoman Government recognised this minority in a highly turbulent region and period. Do you think the Ottoman reasoning was partly to pit these rising nations against each other, thus keeping them all focussed away from expansion at Ottoman expense?
Abdülhamid II’s Macedonian policy can be summarized as a policy of balance against the rising and clashing Balkan nationalisms and a policy of preserving the status quo as much as possible and buying time. Accordingly, the Romanian-backed Vlah nationalism was in the Ottoman interest. The entry of a new actor into the game, albeit a very small one, would strengthen the hand of Abdülhamit II. Moreover, Germany also supported Vlach rights in line with its “drive to the east” (Drang Nach Osten) policy. The Ottomans needed Germany at this time instead of the lost support of Britain.
8- What are you working on right now?
Recently, I’m working on the exodus of non-Muslims from Eastern Thrace after the Balkan Wars.