Anglo-Turkish Society

Jack Snowden in-person lecture: ‘Translating from the Ottoman World’, 25 October 2022 - flyer:

Jack Snowden in centre surrounded by friends post lecture.

1- The Ottoman / Turkish ground you cover in terms of studying the artefacts and events of interest is extensive in terms of themes and topics. Do you think this richness comes from not concentrating on the Ottoman archives which is the classic academic first call for academics but going for often neglected personal and military writings?

My main goal is to get as much Ottoman and Turkish material into English as possible so that it gets a wider distribution, and by posting the translations on Academia I can reach the farthest corners of the globe without “hoping against hope” that people will see it in a bookstore somewhere. Most of the material that gets transcribed from Ottoman (either from the archives or elsewhere) into Turkish never makes it into English and a huge portion of Turkish material never sees the English light of day, so to speak, either. In other words, a lot of valuable information of interest to people on a variety of topics is “locked” in Turkish so I try to “unlock” it into English.

Personal memoirs often contain first-hand details of well-known and little-known events. For example, İhsan Aksoley, a young Ottoman lieutenant, was sent to Libya by Enver Paşa to set up a radio-telegraph station in Fezzan, in southwestern Libya in 1917. Aksoley reached Libya from Istanbul by train through Vienna to Pula on the Adriatic Sea coast and from there to Misrata in a German submarine. After internment as a POW in Italy, Aksoley returned to Istanbul for feats of derring-do in pro-Nationalist communications efforts in occupied Istanbul. He wrote about all of this in 1969-1972 in modern Turkish, published in the magazine “Hayat Tarih”. Very little was known about the details of these events until Aksoley wrote his articles – but only Turkish readers could learn about these remarkable details and only by stumbling upon the long-ago magazine articles. Memoirs like Aksoley’s are invaluable in this regard but even more so, for many more people, when translated into English.

2- You are mostly self-thought in terms of Ottoman language analysis and translation. Clearly this is a steep learning curve and what advice would you give budding researchers who wish to progress in your footsteps? Are there useful online resources to help you along?

When I retired from U.S. government service I chose Ottoman as my retirement project since I had the time to pursue it and I knew that Ottoman would be a bottomless pit of interesting material to work with for years to come. I had a good foundation in modern Turkish, which is almost mandatory for anyone interested in moving on to Ottoman. First off, the Ottoman script is the initial barrier but I had a good background in reading the somewhat similar Urdu script so that helped to surmount this obstacle to some degree. Next, I began to take courses offered by Turkish organizations like Tarih Vakfı in Ankara and Istanbul to learn the grammatical rules that underly Ottoman – different in many ways from modern Turkish - and to get exposure to the “hocas” (teachers) who are experts in Ottoman. I spent a lot of time in the Ottoman Archives in Gülhane, Istanbul, wrestling with hand-written Ottoman, which is much more difficult to “unpack” than type-set Ottoman documents. Like anyone’s handwriting, the handwriting of Ottomans is somewhat standard but with personal flourishes. I transcribed a long manuscript by the Turkish writer Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın and only got through it by getting used to his personal flourishes page by page.

There are resources available for learning Ottoman online but I prefer in-class learning for the personal contact with teachers and students, and in-hand books/dictionaries – one always stumbles upon a new word when leafing through a dictionary.

3- Clearly deciphering the 'matchbox notebooks' journal of wife’s grandfather’s ordeal in Russian captivity was an emotional project which required great diligence to read and transcribe. What sort of reaction did you get when you published the book of that memoir by others whose ancestors might have had a similar experience as an Ottoman POW?

This was my first project in Ottoman and for that reason, and the handwritten text, it was particularly daunting. I relied on the help of a number of Ottoman experts to get through the diary over the course of two years and we finally got it published in Turkish at the end of 2010. Also, my brother-in-law Fuad Tokad had photographed and enlarged each of the 300+ pages of the diary so I was able to work from those photos rather than squint through the tiny diary pages.

The reaction was very favorable with lots of articles in newspapers about the book at that time. The relatives of some of the individuals mentioned in the book got in touch with me and I eventually translated the ordeal of Tahir Baykal, who went to Russia as a POW with Mehmet Fuad, my wife’s grandfather, into English – his son Yurdakul had written about his father’s story and published the book “From Darende to Siberia” in Turkish.

4- One of the projects you worked on was the diary of an Ottoman envoy’s arduous mission to the Ethiopian Emperor Menelik IInd. Why do you think the Ottomans felt the need to establish diplomatic relations to this distant country at the time?

Sultan Abdülhamid II liked to hob-nob with his fellow potentates and relations with Ethiopia at the turn of the 20th century were in abeyance, although they stretched back to the beginning of the 16th century when the Ottoman Empire had a presence on both sides of the Red Sea. Italy, in particular, but also England and other European nations, were increasing their footprint in and around Ethiopia at that time, which may have been another reason for Abdülhamid’s desire to re-establish the long-dormant relationship. The envoy’s trip was indeed arduous, as he described it in detail, campsite by campsite all the way to and from Addis Ababa.

Almost every day I see on Academia that someone else in Ethiopia has read the English version of the envoy’s trek. Of course, they could never read the Turkish version so the combination of English and Academia made the story available to them.

5- Another story you worked on was Ahmet Esad (Tomruk), the Turkish boxer-cum-secret agent during the Turkish war of independence who spied on the Greeks posing as an American journalist. Do we know how he was able to provide that intelligence gathered to the distant Kemalist forces?

When Tomruk was in the area south of the Sea of Marmara during the Turkish War of Independence he was able to pass the intelligence he gathered to Ankara through the Turkish Nationalists in Balıkesir, until it was occupied by advancing Greek forces. When he was in Izmir he came up with this mechanism:

“In order to transmit the intelligence I obtained in Izmir back to the Kuva-yı Milliye, while in Antalya I made arrangements with one of the foreign consulates there to set up a channel. As part of this plan, Antalya provincial subdivision governor Aşir Bey had me contact his ill sister in Izmir so that “Mr. Herri Villiy” could keep him abreast of her health status. So by means of the foreign consulate’s diplomatic pouch, I sent my reports to Aşir Bey from Izmir without scrutiny by censors.”

Additionally İhsan Aksoley’s efforts to facilitate communications between the Nationalists operating under “Great Powers” occupation in Istanbul and Ankara in 1920 are fascinating. But almost every story about Nationalist activities includes hints of their communications means and techniques.

6- Were you surprised by the range of languages and sources the Ottoman military journal covered, and thus preserved to the present day as presumably many of these original accounts are now lost to history. Do you think this journal had a more purely intellectual focus or were the various accounts such as the 'German Trans-Caucasus Expedition of 1918’ had important lessons to draw upon for the reader regarding aspects of strategy and ‘understanding the other side’? Till what date did this journal continue and do you see a lasting legacy of Ataturk here who in his own writings placed great capital on the intellectual development of an officer corps beyond military and arms knowledge?

“Askeri Mecmua” (Military Journal) was published from 1923 to 1941 and up until 1929 in Ottoman Turkish. Most of the articles concern soldiering – training, maneuvers, etc. The others, though, about Turkish military campaigns (e.g. Turk-Armenian battles in Nachivan in 1920 and the Ottoman Islamic Army of the Caucasus in 1918– both in Ottoman Turkish; Turkish Nationalist battles on multiple fronts in 1920 – in modern Turkish) and some campaigns by foreign armies (e.g. German Transcaucasus Expedition, an English intelligence officer on the Caucasus Front – in Ottoman Turkish; Italian battles during the Turkey-Italy war of 1911-1912 – in modern Turkish) are gems that very few Turks have read, let alone foreigners. Putting these into English makes them that much more available worldwide and sometimes Turks who don’t know Ottoman will ask me for the modern Turkish transcription from the Ottoman original.

Atatürk’s impact is evident in the journal, as it was everywhere else in Turkey during his stewardship. There are a lot of articles praising him and his exploits going back to his time in Libya, WWI and the War of Independence but most of the information is already well-known even in the English-speaking world so I avoid translating them.

7- The company that ran the Istanbul ferry service wrote a report of how all the ferries had to support the war effort presumably mostly supplying the troops guarding the straights of the Dardanelles during that campaign in 1915 but they paid a heavy price with storms and British submarines operating in the Sea of Marmara and Russian submarines in the Black Sea. Were these vessels effectively sitting ducks for submarines or did Turkey at the time have any counter measures such as depth charges or did that technology come much later? Were there also allied merchant ships caught in harbours with the outbreak of the war pressed for similar dangerous service?

I was very surprised to find this ferry story, not having given any thought to the ferries’ role in the War. They were built for the Bosphorus and the Golden Horn so pressing them into service in the Sea of Marmara for troop transport and, worse, the Black Sea for coal shipments (because enemy England wasn’t supplying coal for the ferries during the War), was certain to result in losses from rough seas and enemy submarine attacks. I don’t know about any allied ships commandeered. The most famous “commandeering” incident, of course, was the Ottoman Navy’s adoption of the German warships “Göben” and “Breslau” that became the “Yavuz” and “Midilli” in the Ottoman Navy in August 1914, ensuring Turkey’s entry into the War on the side of the Central Powers.

8- One of your scoops for you was the secret negotiations that took place between the Russians and Enver Pasa at the start of WWI where Enver Pasa offered for the disposal of the Russians to be used in the Balkans in return for Russia not attacking Turkey. Had this worked Turkey may have stayed neutral in WWI, which clearly would have been advantageous for a war-weary country. Do you think Enver was a military realist or even a visionary, but events over-took him and it all ended very costly for Turkey with the final dismemberment of the Empire?

Enver Paşa is an endless source of fascinating stories. I don’t think, though, that he wanted Turkey to remain neutral in the War. The best example of this for me came in Ali Fuad’s courtesy call with him in the summer of 1914 as Ali Fuad was on his way to the Suez Canal:

“Enver Paşa did not appear to be pleased to hear my words and very likely he inferred that I was not eager to see our country enter the War. Yet, from his point of view, war was a chance for a young warrior to win fame and glory. In Enver Paşa’s mind, he was convinced that he had come into the world to achieve the great things that fate had ordained and that war was essential to accomplishing these fateful events and to satisfying his ambitions. He considered peace to be an absurd state and an unnatural one. The young dictator’s spiritual guiding star was war, which, he believed, had turned destiny toward him and its fulfilment was his essential duty. In Enver Paşa’s view, the main goal of coming into the world was to die with honour and to make some fine bayonet attacks before one dies. Besides bayonet attacks, everything else in life is secondary, according to him, and he was sure that world history was written with the point of a bayonet. His nature was such that he could not think otherwise”.

Here is another quote from the account of the Ottoman Army’s retreat from Palestine in 1918, written by participant Major Vecihi, about Enver Paşa:

“Our commander-in-chief (Enver Paşa) thought that a few cavalry companies dispatched to the Black Sea coast could conduct raids inside Russia and destroy its railroads; that the fortress of Batumi and Ardahan could be taken with the help of local gangs; and that by occupying a country like Iran with a force of a few battalions an attack could be made on India. There was not even a whiff of reality in any of those ideas.”

I found a couple of interviews with Enver Paşa (in Istanbul in the Spring of 1914 before the War and in Baku in 1920) that had, to my knowledge, never been published in English. Also, I stumbled on an ultimatum he sent to Russian leader Trotsky in 1922 when he was in the Buhara-Tajikistan area with the Basmachi rebels there.

Enver Paşa was certainly a “big thinker” in terms the scope of his vision. Sending İhsan Aksoley to Fezzan, Libya, in 1917 was evidently part of his vision of establishing Ottoman control of North Africa up to the Atlantic Ocean after, he hoped, the Ottoman Army seized the Suez Canal and conquered Egypt. But this Napoleonic mentality stumbled badly in late 1914 and early 1915 at Sarıkamış, at the cost of, by some estimates, 90,000 Turkish soldiers. He seemed indifferent to such costs and sought to please the Germans, whom he idolized, however he could. Enver Paşa was a genius of sorts but a flawed, emotional one, especially when compared to Mustafa Kemal Paşa, who had equally expansive vision but who proceeded deliberately and realistically.

9- Reading the various military journals of the period do you get a sense of the logic why the Young Turks before WWI were very much in the German camp, in which Austria, their traditional enemy was also part of? Did the British at the time through diplomacy try their best to counter that drift or were their perceived strong support for Greece and other successor states one of the reasons for that cooling of relations?

As mentioned above, Enver Paşa was enamoured by Germany and the Germans – he served as the Ottoman military attaché in Berlin in 1909 and met Kaiser Wilhelm II at that time. As Enver Paşa’s influence in the CUP grew so did the Turkish inclination toward Germany, always at odds with France, England and Russia. Up until this lean toward Germany, Turkey’s most dominant European influence was France and most Turkish officers learned French well. England was almost always an irritant for the Ottoman Empire – in Egypt especially. Austria is interesting vis-a-vis the Ottomans, in light of their centuries battling one another – see “Ottoman-Russia-Austria War of 1736-1739 – Turkish Perspective” – but once allied with the dominant Germany in WWI the Austrians warmed to the Ottomans and German U-boats plied the Mediterranean Sea from the Austrian naval base at Pula on the Adriatic Sea coast ferrying Ottoman soldiers and materials to Libya – see “Enver Paşa, German U-boats and the Ottoman Army in Libya 1917-1919”.

10- You pay tribute to Sir James Redhouse who produced the first Ottoman-English dictionary and that volume is still published today. Clearly this was a labour of love for that pioneer and do you know much about his life that drove him to undertake that arduous task?

As I mentioned in London, Redhouse dictionaries amaze Turkish Ottoman scholars who haven’t seen them before because they have depth and breadth not found elsewhere. Redhouse himself spent quite a bit of time in Turkey working for the Ottoman government (1826-1854) before he retired to write his dictionaries. I’m helpless without them.

11- Ali Fuat Pasha was tasked with the doomed attack on Suez in the dying days of the Empire, yet ironically was anti-war in sentiment. Was Enver Pasha as commander-in-chief blind to the parlous state of the army and the protestations of the various officials who could see fighting on multiple fronts at this stage was suicidal?

As mentioned in response to question 8 above, Enver Paşa seemed to regard war as man’s natural state and certainly the best way to achieve fame and glory. In this regard, again quoting from Ali Fuad’s book:

“On still another day, Col. Frankenberg said that the German Emperor sent General Liman von Sanders a telegram aimed at accelerating Turkey’s entry into the War: ‘You personally go to Enver Paşa, give him my personal regards, and tell him that the Emperor has extraordinary faith in him and that all the member of the German military training element, foremost among them Limon von Sanders, are ready to come under the command of Enver Paşa.’ Enver Paşa’s nature and inclination was such that he could not long resist such praise.”

“Enver Paşa had no doubt about God’s support and favour. He considered failure and defeat to be a spiritual test so his conviction that in the end he would achieve victory was unshakeable. I saw this faith of Enver’s first-hand during the War when he visited Medine. As soon as he disembarked from the train he walked straight toward “Ravza-i Mutahhara”, the Prophet’s resting place, which was quite a distance from the rail station. Together with Enver Paşa, Cemal Paşa, Faisal Bey (the future King of Iraq), Moslem clergymen and notables, also walked to the Prophet’s tomb. The route was lined with crowds cheering Enver Paşa and his entourage but he seemed not even to notice. He only wanted, as commander-in-chief, to be in the presence of the Prophet and receive his blessing. Enver Paşa placed his arms on his chest in a gesture of reverence, bowed his head and silently wept throughout this walk.”

12- Together with your colleague George Angell you have been translating novels from the Republican period of Turkey such as Sabahattin Ali’s İçimizdeki Şeytan [the devil within us] and earlier Yaprak Dökümü [leaf fall] and Kürk Mantolu Madonna [Madonna in a fur coat]. Clearly you get a better insight into this late author through working with his material and from that do you get a sense why the Turkish state viewed him so much suspicion and ending with his tragic death under mysterious circumstances?

These translations of novels has been at George’s initiative – I’m sort of a “sounding board” and checker. He has done the “heavy lifting” translation-wise, while I review his work and sometimes offer second opinions. Based on what I’ve found out about Ali’s death, he was hoping to escape lawsuits and other pressures connected to his “leftist” views – he was accused of being a “communist” - when he was killed by his guide when about to cross the Turkey-Bulgaria border illegally. It seems that it was a “hit” by the “rightist” elements in Turkey at that time. In any case, herewith George’s input (also included is George’s commentary about an English translation published by Penguin of “Madonna”):

While I’m by no means an authority on Sabahattin Ali, it does strike me after translating Madonna in collaboration with Jack that Ali’s jabs at the more slavish side of the Europeanizing frenzy, especially among the educated, will have rubbed the Republic’s authorities the wrong way. We have to bear in mind how militant and uncompromising the pro-Western, anti-Islamic orientation of the Kemalist government was, almost unimaginably so when today’s AKP-run Turkey is our frame of reference. For a keenly perceptive man like Ali, the catastrophic specter of the rise of Nazi Germany, at its pinnacle when The Devil Within Us and Madonna were written, was surely a bright red warning light about an unqualified embrace of “Europe”. Whether his articulation of that viewpoint in fiction actually had anything to do with his troubles with the security services and his eventual murder is fertile ground for research.

The lion’s share of my review of the Penguin translation is, I should acknowledge, a somewhat nuts and bolts consideration of its egregious inaccuracies. An accurate translation is badly needed. Jack and I hope to find a publisher for ours.

13- You also worked on a ship’s log that ferried supplies from Bolshevik Russia across the Black Sea to the nationalist forces under Mustafa Kemal. Did this log give a good indication of the type and quantity of supplies provided and do you think these were indeed what it took to break the Greek incursion deep in Anatolia in 1922?

There were two ship’s logs from the “Alemdar” that were in the possession of the captain’s family, one member of which was my classmate in an Ottoman class. She wanted to transcribe the logs from Ottoman like I did with my wife’s grandfather’s diary, so we collaborated. The logs were handwritten in Ottoman Turkish and contained lots of Italian and French maritime terms that had to be “deciphered” from Ottoman script.

The “Alemdar” escaped from occupied Istanbul in early 1921 to Ereğli on the western Black Sea coast to serve the Nationalist cause. Ultimately, the ship was based at Trabzon on the eastern Black Sea coast and went to Novorossisk, Russia, to obtain weapons and ammunition supplied by the Bolsheviks to the Nationalists. These supplies were then brought to İnebolu and Amasya for transport overland to Ankara. Most analysts of the War of Independence agree that such supplies ferried across the Black Sea from Bolshevik Russia by “Alemdar” and other ships were a decisive factor in bolstering the Nationalist war effort and capacity to wage war against the Greeks in western Anatolia.

14- You also translated the writings of the Greek General Papulas’s Bitter Memoir of Anatolian Campaigns and Rival General Strategos. Do you get the feeling that the Greek offensive thinking was not only confused but uncoordinated with these two differing generals that help lead to the disaster of the subsequent battle of Sakarya in 1921?

I got a sense of the military-political dynamic behind the Greek offensive from the Papulas book and it was refreshing to see the battle from a non-Turkish perspective. By 1921 the Greek Army was overextended and venturing into Anatolia too far away from its logistical resources. These material problems were “complemented” by the political infighting in Athens and the Papulas-Strategos rivalry in Anatolia, ending in defeat for the Greeks at Sakarya and a year later in Izmir.

15- What are you working on right now?

I’ve just finished the memoir of İhsan Aksoley from his time in Libya and occupied Istanbul. Right now I’m translating a report that Mustafa Kemal filed in September 1917 when he was the commander of the 7th Army on the Palestine Front. The report is noteworthy from the standpoint of Mustafa Kemal’s searing criticism of German Commander Erich von Falkenhayn, which did not sit well with German-admirer Enver Paşa, and Mustafa Kemal’s lobbying for command of the Sinai Front, citing his success at Çanakkale as proof of his readiness. Perhaps predictably, Falkenhayn stayed and Mustafa Kemal relinquished his command of the 7th Army.

The report was published for the first time in 1956 by Hikmet Bayur, who was Atatürk’s presidential general secretary in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Bayur obtained the report from Salih Bozok, who was Mustaf Kemal’s lifelong friend and chief aide in Syria. I don’t know whether this report has ever been translated and published in English.

I recently stumbled upon 3 interesting letters written by Ali Kemal in 1913, when he was in Vienna: letter 1, letter 2, translation:

Questions by Craig Encer, December 2022